Global Rosé Wine Market Report, Size & Forecast 2026–2033

A category with no legal definition and a rising share

Rosé is the only wine colour that has gained share continuously for two decades. The OIV's colour series, which runs from 2000 to 2021, puts rosé at 6 to 7 per cent of world wine production at the start of the century and more than 8 per cent in recent years, with world rosé production up 25 per cent between 2001 and 2021 — in a period when red wine production fell by a quarter from its 2004 peak.

There is no legal definition of rosé anywhere in the world that does not reduce to a winemaking method. Red is maceration on skins, white is pressing without them, and rosé is either a short maceration or a direct pressing — with the additional complication that blending red and white wine to make rosé is permitted in some jurisdictions and prohibited in most. That single difference means the colour series is not perfectly comparable across countries, and this report says so before it quotes a share.

The direction of travel is not in doubt. Red wine lost 25 per cent of its production volume and its share of world production fell from 48 to 43 per cent; white rose from 46 to 49 per cent, driven largely by sparkling; rosé went from about 7 to more than 8. Those three numbers are the structural story of world wine, and rosé is the smallest of them.

How this number is built, and where it can be attacked

This report derives rosé from the parent category rather than claiming an independent measurement, because no statistical agency publishes a rosé series in both volume and value. The parents are ours and already published: USD 528.4 billion of world wine value in 2025, forecast at USD 712.6 billion in 2033, on 208.0 million hectolitres falling to 189.0 million.

Two assumptions carry the number. The first is the share — 8.5 per cent of volume, inside the OIV's stated range, and the band above is what happens at the ends of that range. The second is the price ratio: we assume rosé trades at 1.05 times the blended average of all wine, on the view that the category's growth has been concentrated in the premium tiers that the OIV attributes to France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. That ratio is ours. At parity the 2025 value is USD 44.91 billion; at 1.10 it is USD 49.41 billion, and a reader who disagrees with us should start there.

France is more than a third of world demand

The OIV's consumption finding is that France represents more than one-third of global rosé demand, and that the growth of the rosé market is attributable to increased demand in the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. That is an unusual shape: one origin market that drinks a third of the world's supply, and three Anglophone and Northern European markets that supply the growth.

It matters because the three growth markets are all still-wine markets where rosé is a seasonal product bought in a supermarket, and the one dominant market is a wine culture where rosé is drunk year-round, often from a protected appellation. A category whose growth comes from seasonal multiples and whose base sits in France has two pricing mechanisms running at once — and the seasonal one is the more volatile.

It also explains why the colour's share rises in a falling market. World wine volume is forecast to fall 1.19 per cent a year to 2033 in our parent series. Anything holding a rising share of that has to be taking volume from red, not adding to the total, and rosé is doing exactly that.

Supply is more concentrated than any other colour

Rosé production is the most concentrated of the three colours: the OIV puts the top ten producing countries at almost 90 per cent of the world total in 2021, and the top three at two-thirds. Compare that with red and white, where no such concentration exists.

Concentration at that level has two consequences for anyone buying or investing in the category. The first is that supply cannot respond smoothly: three countries decide most of the world's rosé, and two of them — France above all — are inside a regulatory framework that constrains planting. The second is that a single national policy change is a global supply event, which is not true of white wine.

The Northern Hemisphere dominates, with Chile and South Africa the non-European producers showing the highest growth rates over the two decades to 2021. That is a supply base built on European appellations with a Southern Hemisphere margin at the edge, and it is why rosé has been able to hold a price premium while red wine lost both volume and price.

Forecast to 2033: a share story, not a volume story

Our forecast is USD 47.03 billion in 2025 rising to USD 68.41 billion in 2033 at 4.80 per cent a year, on volume from 17.68 million to 17.96 million hectolitres at 0.20 per cent. Rosé grows 1.26 times as fast as the parent category in value while its volume is essentially flat — 8.5 per cent of 208.0 million hectolitres in 2025 and 9.5 per cent of 189.0 million in 2033.

That is the honest shape of the number, and it is the same mechanism we found in the parent report: the wine market's value growth is price, not liquid. Rosé's value share rises from 8.9 to 9.6 per cent over eight years while its volume share rises from 8.5 to 9.5 — which means the forecast assumes rosé's price premium slightly erodes relative to the category, and the category's own price rise does all the work. At a constant 1.05 price ratio the 2033 value would be higher; at parity it would be USD 67.70 billion.

Anyone modelling rosé as a growth category in volume terms is modelling it wrong. The volume path we publish is 0.20 per cent a year — inside the noise of a single OIV revision — and the value path is 4.80 per cent. The gap between those two figures is the category's entire commercial case and its entire risk at the same time.

Risk

1. The share is the estimate. 8.5 per cent is our reading of "more than 8 per cent". At 8.0 the value is USD 44.39 billion, at 9.0 it is USD 49.93 billion — a fifth of the headline moves with a number nobody measures annually.

2. The price ratio is ours, not the industry's. We assume rosé at 1.05 times the wine average. At parity, USD 44.80 billion; at 1.10, USD 49.39 billion. Nothing in the public record fixes this.

3. Definitional drift. Countries that permit blending red and white to make rosé report a category that countries prohibiting it do not. A share series built across both is comparable only at the margin.

4. Concentration on the supply side. Three countries make two thirds of the world's rosé. A French planting decision or a Southern Hemisphere drought is a global supply event, and the price premium is the first thing it moves.

5. What is overstated: the idea that rosé is a growth category in the ordinary sense. It is a share story inside a shrinking category — 8.5 to 9.5 per cent of a volume base that falls by a fifth across the forecast window.

Paysage concurrentiel

Competitive Landscape

Rosé competes for shelf space with white wine far more than with red, and the competitive fault line inside the colour is no longer price tier — it is appellation against generic. The two halves are visible in one number. CIVP, the Provence interprofessional council, reports 1,095,423 hectolitres of rosé in 2025 across its three appellations. Against this report’s 17.68 million hectolitres of world rosé that is 6.20 per cent — 146.1 million bottles — from the region that invented the premium category.

Who owns the premium end

The two largest spirits-and-wine groups in Europe both bought Provence estates inside three years, and neither bought capacity. What was purchased was a name, a shelf position and a hectare count small enough to be scarce. That is the shape of capital in this category: at the top it consolidates; everywhere else it does not exist.

The volume sits somewhere else

The three largest French rosés in the United States, on the brands’ own reported figures, are:

• Whispering Angel — 525,000 nine-litre cases, per its own brand leadership at Château d’Esclans. Provence, LVMH.
• La Vieille Ferme — 492,000 cases, up 10 per cent, made by Famille Perrin in the Rhône, not Provence.
• Hampton Water — above 100,000 cases, having nearly doubled in two years, made by Gérard Bertrand in the Languedoc.

Two of the three are not from the appellation that built the category. And the leader itself is 525,000 cases — 47,250 hectolitres, 4.31 per cent of Provence’s entire rosé output. The most successful rosé brand in the world is a rounding error inside its own region’s volume, which means Provence’s 146.1 million bottles are a very long tail and the price premium is defended by a brand structure that does not exist.

The council says so itself. Its 2025 activity report names the competitive problem as “une offre rosé devenue générique” — a rosé offer that has become generic — and lists “tensions sur les prix, déclassements, promotions excessives”: price tension, declassifications and excessive promotion. Its response is a shared recognition mark across the three appellations, launching in 2026, and a formal split between AOP and IGP positioning. When an appellation’s own annual report calls its category generic, the competitive threat is not white wine.

Chaîne de valeur

Value Chain

The chain differs from red and white in one decisive place: rosé is usually made from grapes grown for another purpose. Where a short maceration is used, the same fruit can be bled off a red fermentation — the saignée method — which makes rosé a by-product decision rather than a planting decision. Where direct pressing is used, a dedicated block is farmed for it. The two routes have different cost bases and produce different wines, and both are counted as the same colour in the statistics.

Provence has effectively chosen the second route and converted to it. On 27,428 hectares, the three appellations produced 1,238,862 hectolitres in 2025: 89 per cent rosé (1,095,423 hl), 6 per cent white (74,075 hl) and 5 per cent red (58,453 hl). Côtes de Provence alone is 902,027 hl, of which 814,611 is rosé; Coteaux d’Aix-en-Provence adds 216,459 hl and Coteaux Varois 120,376 hl. A region that once made three colours now makes one, and the other two survive as a residue.

That series is the supply story in one column. 2024 was the weakest harvest of the decade; 2025 recovered 9.62 per cent and is still 5.17 per cent below 2022. A premium category whose volume swings by a tenth between vintages cannot defend a price premium with scarcity, because it has none.

Production itself is straightforward and cheap relative to red: weeks of skin contact become hours, so the capital tied up in a rosé is a fraction of that in a red of the same volume. That is why the category can grow quickly and why it can also collapse quickly — supply can be switched on inside a single vintage, and in most of the world it is.

Route to market decides the price. The growth markets buy rosé as a seasonal multiple listing, which is a price-taking position; France buys it as an appellation product, which is not. The 1.05 price ratio this report uses for the whole colour is an average across those two very different routes, and the CIVP’s decision to create a recognition mark is an attempt to move the first route onto the second’s terms. It is a label intervention, because the chain offers no other leverage.

Activité d'investissement

Investment Activity

Capital in rosé is generally not allocated to rosé. It is allocated to a winery that makes red and white and treats rosé as a seasonal line, which is why the category has almost no dedicated production assets outside Provence and a small number of appellations.

Where dedicated capital does move, it buys brands rather than capacity, and the record is short enough to list in full. LVMH took 55 per cent of Château d’Esclans in December 2019 and Château du Galoupet in the same year; Pernod Ricard signed for a majority of Château Sainte Marguerite — one of eighteen Cru Classé estates in Provence — on 2 March 2022. Both transactions were for positions at the top of the price ladder, and both left the vineyards roughly as they were, with modest extensions planned.

Nothing in the record is a greenfield decision. No group has built capacity to supply the share the colour has gained for two decades. That absence is the investment finding: a category that grew its share of a falling base without attracting dedicated capital is being supplied by spare capacity elsewhere in the wine chain — a red tank bled off in a downturn, an IGP block switched to a pale style, a Rhône or Languedoc co-op filling a rosé listing.

The consequence is now visible at the bottom of the chain rather than the top. CIVP’s 2025 report asks for “economic balance and value sharing” between production and trade and names declassifications and excessive promotion as current practice — that is an appellation describing a price it thinks is too low, at a time when its own harvest recovered 9.62 per cent. There is no capital cycle to correct it, because there is no capital in it.

Technologie et innovation

Technology and Innovation

Technical innovation in rosé is concentrated in colour stability and consistency. The colour is the product, and holding it through bottling, transport and shelf life is the difference between a premium listing and a delisting. Fining, filtration, inert handling and protective packaging are the relevant levers, and all of them are well established rather than novel.

The more consequential change is in the vineyard: as the growth markets demand a paler, more consistent style, the pressure moves to picking date and block selection, which raises the share of rosé made deliberately rather than bled off a red tank. That shift increases cost per litre and is part of why the price ratio this report assumes may prove conservative. LVMH’s plan to add 60 hectares of Côtes de Provence vines at Château d’Esclans is that shift expressed as capital: the pale, consistent style is a farming decision before it is a winemaking one.

The one genuinely new piece of technology in the category is institutional, not industrial. CIVP’s 2025 report records two structural projects: the Vitipole Provence Rosé, which finally became operational and gathers the technical resources of the trade in one place, and a shared recognition mark across the three appellations, developed during 2025 and launching in 2026. A mark is not a process — but in a category where the product can be copied in any warm region with a red press, distinguishing the appellation on shelf is the only defensible innovation left.

There is no technology story in rosé comparable to de-alcoholisation. The category’s version of that question is the alcohol-free rosé already stocked beside it, made from de-alcoholised wine and carrying the same structural problem we set out in our no-alcohol report: the product is legally defined, the duty saving is real, and none of it accrues to the rosé producer whose shelf it takes.

Risque de marché

Risk Factors and Disruption Threats

1. The share is the estimate. 8.5 per cent is our reading of the OIV’s ‘more than 8 per cent’. At 8.0 the value is USD 44.39 billion; at 9.0 it is USD 49.93 billion.

2. The price ratio is ours. Rosé at 1.05 times the wine average: at parity USD 44.91 billion, at 1.10 USD 49.41 billion. Nothing in the public record fixes it.

3. Generic substitution is the live threat, and the appellation has named it. CIVP’s 2025 report describes “a rosé offer that has become generic”, with price tension, declassifications and excessive promotion. Two of the three largest French rosés in the United States are made outside Provence, and the leading Provence brand is 4.31 per cent of the region’s own output. The premium is not protected by scarcity.

4. Harvest volatility. 2024 was the decade’s weakest harvest at 1,130,139 hl; 2025 recovered to 1,238,862 hl, still 5.17 per cent below 2022. A one-tenth swing between vintages moves the price of the colour more than any marketing decision.

5. Tariffs. The 15 per cent measure on European wine and spirits in force from 1 July 2026, with a 31 December 2029 sunset, lands on a category whose premium tier is thin and whose US position is a seasonal listing — the most easily delisted product on the shelf.

6. Definitional drift. Countries permitting red-white blending report a category that countries prohibiting it do not.

7. Supply concentration. Three countries make two thirds of the world’s rosé; a French planting decision or a Southern Hemisphere drought is a global supply event, and the price premium is the first thing it moves.

8. What is overstated: the idea that rosé is a growth category in the ordinary sense. It gains share of a base that falls by a fifth over the forecast window, and its only two decades of share gain have not attracted a single greenfield investment.

Paysage réglementaire

Regulatory Landscape

Definition. No jurisdiction defines rosé by anything other than method. The consequence that matters for measurement is blending: where red and white wine may be blended to produce a rosé, the reported volume includes wine that a country prohibiting blending would never count as rosé.

Appellations. The premium end of the category sits inside protected designations that fix boundary, variety and yield. Provence’s three — Côtes de Provence, Coteaux d’Aix-en-Provence and Coteaux Varois en Provence — cover 27,428 hectares and produced 1,238,862 hectolitres in 2025, 89 per cent of it rosé. Those rules are the only place where rosé supply is genuinely constrained, and they cover a minority of world volume.

A label as regulation. CIVP developed a shared recognition mark for its three appellations during 2025, for launch in 2026, alongside a formal segmentation between AOP and IGP positioning. In a category with no other form of scarcity, the mark is the regulatory instrument — an attempt to make appellation origin legible at the point of sale rather than inferred from a bottle shape.

Labelling and alcohol. The Council of the European Union agreement of December 2025, formally adopted on 23 February 2026, defines ‘alcohol-free’ as below 0.5 per cent alcohol by volume and a separate ‘0.0 per cent’ category as below 0.05 per cent, with an alcohol-reduced category at least 30 per cent below the pre-de-alcoholisation strength. The agreement applies to rosé as to any wine, and it creates a defined product that sits directly beside the category on the same shelf.

Duty. Wine duty treatment varies by market and by strength, and a category whose price premium is thin relative to red is more exposed to a per-litre duty change than a higher-priced one.

Sources

Rosé has no world series of its own in both volume and value — no interprofessional body counts it the way the Comité Champagne counts Champagne — so this report is built from the colour series of the body that measures world wine, the harvest and market record of the one region that publishes its own, and the transaction record of the groups buying into it. Everything else in these chapters is our arithmetic on this segment’s own wine series, as the closing paragraph says.

• International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV): oiv.int. The colour series running from 2000 to 2021, the movement in rosé from 6 to 7 per cent of world wine production at the start of the century to more than 8 per cent in recent years, the 25 per cent growth in rosé production between 2001 and 2021, the parallel fall of a quarter in red production, and the finding that France represents more than one-third of global rosé demand.
• Conseil Interprofessionnel des Vins de Provence (CIVP): vinsdeprovence.com. The 2025 harvest series back to 2016 for all three appellations; the colour split of 89 per cent rosé, 6 per cent white and 5 per cent red on 27,428 hectares; the individual appellation volumes; the 2025 activity report’s finding of a rosé offer “that has become generic”, of price tension, declassifications and excessive promotion; the shared recognition mark for 2026; and the Vitipole Provence Rosé.
• LVMH: the 55 per cent acquisition of Château d’Esclans in December 2019, the estate’s 267 hectares with 74 hectares of Côtes de Provence vines and the plan to add 60 hectares, and the separate purchase of Château du Galoupet in the same year — as reported by Decanter.
• Pernod Ricard: the press release of 2 March 2022 announcing a majority shareholding in Château Sainte Marguerite, Cru Classé Côtes-de-Provence since 1955, and its placement alongside Mumm and Perrier-Jouët.
• Council of the European Union, wine labelling agreement, formally adopted 23 February 2026: consilium.europa.eu. The alcohol-free, 0.0 per cent and alcohol-reduced definitions.

What is ours and not a publisher’s. The 8.5 per cent share of world wine is our reading of a stated figure of more than 8 per cent, and Risk Factors gives the outcomes at 8.0 and 9.0. The 1.05 price ratio against the wine average is our assumption and nothing in the public record fixes it; Risk Factors gives the outcomes at parity and at 1.10. The 6.20 per cent of world rosé that Provence supplies, the 146.1 million bottles, the 4.31 per cent share of Provence held by its largest single brand and the 5.17 per cent fall against the 2022 harvest are our arithmetic on the volumes above. The value series, the forecast window and the decline in the base are our model. The brand volumes quoted in the competitive chapter are the brands’ own reported figures, not scan data.

What this means for a reader. The structural claims in this report are safe: origin concentration, the seasonality, the absence of a category leader and the competitive position against white wine do not depend on the two assumptions. The headline value does. Anyone using the USD figure for a decision should move the share and the ratio to their own view first, which is why both are published as assumptions rather than buried in a model.