Editorial Article
The Eleven Behind the Three: Who Actually Sells India's Satellite Internet
Every headline about Indian satellite internet is about three companies: OneWeb India Communications, Jio Satellite Communications and Starlink Satellite Communications. Those are the three entities holding Unified Licence authorisation for Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite, confirmed in a Lok Sabha reply of 5 August 2026. They are also, as of October 2026, three companies that cannot legally bill an Indian customer for anything.
The list that matters commercially is one line further down the same answer. Eleven companies hold Unified Licence authorisation for Commercial VSAT CUG — Nelco, Hughes Communications India, BSNL, Reliance Jio Infocomm, OneWeb India, Jio Satellite, Starlink, Avantel, Cloudcast Digital, ONEOTT Intertainment and Inmarsat India. Those are the entities that can terminate traffic to an enterprise, install a terminal, hold a service-level agreement and raise an invoice.
This is the layer where India’s satellite revenue will be booked, and it is largely absent from the coverage. It is also the layer the regulator is now deliberately separating from the constellation operators — which makes it the more interesting half of the market, not the smaller one.
First, a correction to the framing
It would be neat to describe this as eleven independents standing between three constellations and the Indian customer. That is not what the licence lists say. Three of the eleven — OneWeb India, Jio Satellite and Starlink — are the constellations’ own Indian entities. The real structure is three integrated players holding both layers, and eight independents holding only the retail and ground layer: Nelco and Hughes Communications India at the head of the list, with BSNL, Reliance Jio Infocomm, Avantel, Cloudcast Digital, ONEOTT Intertainment and Inmarsat India alongside them.
That distinction is the whole argument. For the three integrated players, the ground layer is a distribution channel for their own capacity. For the eight, satellite retail is the business, and its economics are set by wholesale capacity prices they do not control — a position that is either a squeeze or a moat depending on what they own besides the licence.
The regulator is drawing a line between the network and the customer
The most important document in Indian satellite right now is not a licence. It is TRAI’s Consultation Paper No. 06/2026 of 8 April 2026, on a framework for Satellite Communication Network authorisation and the assignment of spectrum, and the responses filed to it.
Amazon’s submission on behalf of Kuiper Services India — now trading its application as Amazon Leo — sets out the architecture the industry is arguing for, and does so with unusual clarity. Satellite Communication Network authorisation, in its words, is a network authorisation enabling SCNaaS; it does not permit the provision of telecommunication services directly to end users. The SCN entity should control the space segment, through landing rights with IN-SPACe authorisation, and the ground segment, meaning the gateway earth stations and associated infrastructure. The user segment — customer terminals and user equipment — should be owned and managed by the partnering service provider, consistent with what Amazon calls the wholesale-only nature of the authorisation. Feeder-link spectrum for gateway earth stations should be assigned to the SCN entity; user-link spectrum should be assigned to the service provider. And multiple service providers should be permitted to partner with a single SCN entity.
Read that sequence again, because it is a market design and not a licensing detail. Space segment with the network. Gateways with the network. Terminals with the retailer. User-link spectrum with the retailer. Many retailers per network.
Under that design the constellation operator becomes an input supplier with a capital-intensive asset and no direct claim on the Indian customer, while the retail licence holder becomes the party that holds scarce spectrum, owns the installed terminal base and signs the contract. If it is adopted in roughly that form, the value of an Indian VSAT CUG authorisation rises, and the value of a GMPCS authorisation on its own falls.
What the eight actually own that a constellation cannot buy
Three things, and none of them is a satellite.
Gateways. Every constellation serving India needs Indian gateway earth stations, landing rights authorised through IN-SPACe, and frequency clearances that run through the Standing Advisory Committee on Frequency Allocation and the Satellite Monitoring Centre’s carrier-plan approvals. Amazon asks TRAI to prescribe timelines for exactly those steps — 60 days for in-principle clearance, 30 for SACFA, 45 for SMC and carrier-plan approval — and the reason it has to ask is that LEO satellites have limited operational lives and regulatory delay erodes commercial viability directly. An incumbent that already operates compliant gateways and network operations centres has, in effect, pre-cleared real estate at the only three or four places a constellation needs to be.
The installed base and the field force. VSAT is a truck-roll business. It is antennas on roofs, alignment, maintenance in monsoon, spares in district towns, and a technician who arrives. That is the asset that satellite constellations, whose competence is manufacturing satellites and launching them, have consistently chosen to rent rather than build — and it is why both Bharti Airtel and Jio Platforms signed with SpaceX within twenty-four hours of each other in March 2025, putting Starlink equipment into retail stores and committing to installation and activation mechanisms.
The government and enterprise relationship. A licence is a legal precondition for selling to a public-sector buyer; a decade of delivered contracts is the reason the buyer calls you.
The customers who actually pay
The consumer case in India is close to hopeless on arithmetic, and there is no need to relitigate it here. The relevant summary is that the market already sells wireless data at ₹8.02 a gigabyte — a realisation that fell 10.59% over the year to March 2026 — against an average revenue per wireless user of ₹180.73 a month. A subscriber consuming the average 25.51 gigabytes a month accounts for about ₹204.6 of data revenue, a Pheonix Research calculation from TRAI’s own figures. That is the entire monthly value pool of an average Indian mobile customer, and it is the number any satellite retail tariff has to beat.
The customers who do not care about that number are the ones the eight already sell to.
Public connectivity. In October 2026 BSNL issued a global tender for baseband and VSAT remote equipment to provide backhaul for 2,800 mobile towers and 750 Gram Panchayats under its 4G saturation programme, with an earnest money deposit of ₹8 crore. That is a satellite ground-segment procurement, awarded on capability and compliance rather than consumer price, in which the buyer is a state balance sheet. It is also a template: BharatNet has reached service-ready status in 2.19 lakh of a revised 2.26 lakh Gram Panchayats, 96.9%, at a cost of ₹39,888 crore, and the Comptroller and Auditor General has found significant utilisation deficiencies against that spend. The gap that remains is narrow geographically and hard to serve physically, which is precisely the definition of a satellite contract.
Enterprise verticals. Banking networks, offshore energy, mining, plantations, maritime fleets and aviation compare satellite against the cost of not operating, not against ₹8.02 a gigabyte. SES is positioning its O3b mPOWER medium-earth-orbit fleet at Jio’s 5G backhaul and enterprise business through a shared gateway at Kadapa, and frames itself explicitly as carrier-grade with service-level agreements — a positioning that only makes sense if the buyer is an operator or an enterprise, not a household.
Community institutions. One terminal across a school, a primary health centre or a panchayat office spreads the hardware cost across dozens of users and inverts the per-head economics. It is also where TRAI’s recommended terminal subsidy — against hardware that typically runs ₹20,000 to ₹50,000 — is aimed.
And there is a hard ceiling on the urban alternative that the regulator itself has stated: a single constellation can offer 10,000 to 20,000 connections in an area like Delhi against a requirement of 50 lakh broadband connections. Satellite is a rounding error in Indian urban broadband. It is infrastructure in the places where the alternative is nothing.
Why the landlord-and-tenant model is now the entry route
The clearest evidence that the second layer is where the market clears came from the first layer’s casualty.
The Telecommunications (Authorisation for Provision of Principal Telecommunication Services) Rules, 2026, notified on 23 June 2026, collapsed the old licence categories into five broad service groups and folded satellite communications into general telecom authorisation. Amazon’s GMPCS application was cancelled mid-process. It must reapply. And it is reported to be sounding out partners — Nelco among them — for last-mile delivery, with more than 390 satellites already in orbit and plans for up to 5,105, targeting direct-to-device from 2028.
Sit with that for a moment. A company with 390 satellites in the sky and no Indian retail authorisation did not attempt to buy one. It went looking for a tenant’s landlord. That is the model, and it is the model because the regulator has built an authorisation structure that makes it the cheap route in.
The risk to the eight
The moat is real but it is not a fortress, and three things erode it.
Vertical integration. Three of the eleven are the constellations. Where a network owns its own retail arm, an independent competes for wholesale capacity against a sister company. The framework’s answer — multiple service providers permitted per SCN entity — is a genuine protection, but it protects access to capacity, not the terms on which it is priced.
Distribution capture. The March 2025 Airtel–SpaceX and Jio–SpaceX agreements put constellation hardware in high-street retail stores. That is the consumer channel, and it does not run through Nelco or Hughes. The eight win where the sale requires a site survey, not a SIM.
Regulatory cost, not regulatory risk. The Digital Communications Commission settled spectrum charges on 3 September 2026 at 5% of adjusted gross revenue, with a one-percentage-point discount to 4% for government-notified hard-to-connect and remote border areas, and TRAI has proposed an additional ₹500 per urban subscriber per year with rural exempt. Note where those charges land: on the retail licence holder’s revenue, in the market with the lowest revenue per subscriber of any large economy. The wholesaler pays for feeder-link spectrum. The retailer pays a share of the customer’s bill.
What to watch
- Whether the SCN design survives contact with the final rules. The wholesale-only, terminals-with-the-retailer, user-spectrum-with-the-service-provider architecture is currently a consultation position. If it is adopted, the second layer appreciates. If user-link spectrum is assigned to the network entity instead, the eight become resellers and the analysis above is void.
- The first non-consumer tariff. Enterprise and government pricing will never be published in a headline. Watch tender awards, not tariff pages.
- Whether Amazon Leo’s reapplication is filed alone or with a retail partner named in it. That single detail tells you whether the landlord-tenant model is a stopgap or the structure.
- Gateway approvals. If in-principle, SACFA and SMC clearances acquire published timelines, gateway scarcity falls and the incumbents’ strongest advantage weakens within a year.
- BSNL’s tower and panchayat tender. Who wins the baseband and VSAT equipment contract, and whether the winner is one of the eleven or an import, is the clearest read available on where domestic ground-segment capability actually sits.
The bottom line
India has spent four years licensing three constellations, and none of them can bill a customer. It has spent two decades licensing a second layer that already can. The regulation now being written appears designed to keep those functions apart — space and gateways with the network, terminals, user spectrum and the customer with the licensed retailer.
If that holds, the Indian satellite market will not be won by whoever has the most satellites in orbit. It will be won by whoever already owns the gateways, the field force and the government contract — and can therefore charge a constellation for access to a country. Of the eleven names on the Lok Sabha list, eight have nothing else. For them, that is the whole business, and the regulation currently under consultation is the most valuable thing they own.
References
Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2902, Ministry of Communications, 5 August 2026 — GMPCS and Commercial VSAT CUG authorisation holders.
TRAI Consultation Paper No. 06/2026, 8 April 2026 — Framework for Satellite Communication Network authorisation and assignment of spectrum to Satellite Communication Network providers.
Kuiper Services India Private Limited (Amazon Leo) — response to Consultation Paper No. 06/2026, on SCN authorisation scope, space and ground segment control, user segment ownership, feeder-link and user-link spectrum assignment, and prescribed approval timelines.
TRAI, The Indian Telecom Services Performance Indicators, 2025–26 (PR No. 127/2026), 5 October 2026 — internet and broadband subscribers, average revenue per wireless user, data volume, data revenue and per-gigabyte realisation.
Telecommunications (Authorisation for Provision of Principal Telecommunication Services) Rules, 2026, notified 23 June 2026; Telecommunications Act, 2023, First Schedule.
Ministry of Communications, statement of 8 October 2026 — status of security clearances for GMPCS licensees.
BSNL tender MM/RADIO/VSAT/T-892/2026, October 2026 — baseband and VSAT remote equipment for 2,800 mobile towers and 750 Gram Panchayats.
Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report No. 19 of 2026 — Performance Audit on BharatNet.
Bharti Airtel press release, 11 March 2025; Reliance Industries / Jio Platforms media release, 12 March 2025 — distribution and installation agreements with SpaceX.
Pheonix Research — Orbit Without a Launch: India’s Satellite Internet Market, Its Pending Framework, and the Economics That Decide It. The licensing queue, the spectrum arithmetic and the consumer unit economics.
Pheonix Research — Telecommunication segment coverage.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who are the eleven Commercial VSAT CUG licence holders in India?
Eleven companies hold Unified Licence authorisation for Commercial VSAT CUG in India, per a Lok Sabha reply of 5 August 2026: Nelco, Hughes Communications India, BSNL, Reliance Jio Infocomm, OneWeb India, Jio Satellite, Starlink, Avantel, Cloudcast Digital, ONEOTT Intertainment and Inmarsat India. Three of those — OneWeb India, Jio Satellite and Starlink — are the constellation operators' own Indian entities; the other eight are independent retail and ground-segment operators.
What is the Satellite Communication Network authorisation and why does it matter?
TRAI's Consultation Paper No. 06/2026 of 8 April 2026 proposes a Satellite Communication Network authorisation. As argued in Amazon's response on behalf of Kuiper Services India, that authorisation is a network authorisation enabling SCNaaS that does not permit provision of telecom services directly to end users: the SCN entity controls the space segment and gateway earth stations and receives feeder-link spectrum, while customer terminals, user equipment and user-link spectrum sit with the partnering service provider. Multiple service providers would be allowed per SCN entity.
Why is the consumer satellite broadband market in India so difficult?
Because it decides where the value sits. The market already sells wireless data at ₹8.02 a gigabyte, falling 10.59% over the year to March 2026, against an average revenue per wireless user of ₹180.73 a month — so a subscriber using the average 25.51 GB accounts for about ₹204.6 of data revenue, a Pheonix Research calculation from TRAI data. Satellite wins where the alternative is nothing: baseband and VSAT backhaul for towers and panchayats, banking networks, offshore energy, maritime, defence and community institutions rather than households.
How do constellation operators reach Indian customers if they cannot sell directly?
Both Bharti Airtel and Jio Platforms signed agreements with SpaceX in March 2025 to bring Starlink into Indian retail, covering equipment distribution, enterprise customers, and in Jio's case installation and activation. Separately, Amazon's GMPCS application was cancelled when the 2026 authorisation rules folded satellite into general telecom authorisation, and it is reported to be seeking partners — Nelco among them — for last-mile delivery. Both patterns point the same way: constellations rent India rather than build a retail business in it.
