Editorial Article

Seventy-Five Per Cent of This Market's Growth Is More Tests, and the Companies Selling the Tests Are Not the Ones Collecting It

Updated November 21, 2026

There is a version of the food safety testing market that is easy to sell and hard to defend. In it, a growing population eats more food, regulators tighten, and everything grows. The numbers in that version are comfortable.

The numbers in the real version are stranger and more useful. Over the eight years to 2033, the global market for food safety testing grows from USD 25.8 billion to USD 40.9 billion, a compound annual growth rate of 5.93 per cent. And three quarters of that growth is not a more expensive test. It is simply more tests.

The split is unambiguous. Of the USD 15.1 billion added to the market, USD 11.31 billion — 74.9 per cent — comes from running more tests at roughly the price the market already pays. Only USD 3.79 billion, or 25.1 per cent, comes from each test being worth more. The realised price per test moves from USD 14.49 in 2025 to USD 15.98 in 2033. That is 1.23 per cent a year. In an industry that talks constantly about molecular diagnostics, whole genome sequencing and the digitisation of the laboratory, the average test gets dearer at barely more than the rate of a low-grade inflation.

Why the price barely moves

The answer is that culture-based microbiology refuses to die, and the industry is better off for it.

A culture test is slow, labour-heavy and cheap. A molecular test is fast, less labour-intensive per result and expensive per reaction. The standard industry narrative is substitution: the new method replaces the old one, the average price rises, and the technology vendors capture the difference.

What actually happens is accretion. Molecular methods have taken the applications where time matters most — environmental monitoring above all, where a swab result that arrives on Monday has already cost a plant a production day — but they have not displaced culture from the applications where a confirmed isolate has to survive a regulator, a retailer specification or a courtroom. Culture is the evidential floor of the category. It does not get removed; it gets surrounded.

The arithmetic consequence is that the mix shift is gradual. The expensive method grows, the cheap method does not shrink, and the blended average drifts up slowly. Meanwhile the hardware behind molecular testing gets cheaper on a learning curve, and competition among accredited laboratories passes some of that through. Two forces push in opposite directions at modest magnitude, and the result is 1.23 per cent.

Then there is the second reason, which is more interesting than the first. The number of tests and the number of samples are diverging. A modern laboratory does not test a sample once. It runs a panel: dozens of pesticide residues in one chromatographic run, several mycotoxins in one mass spectrometry acquisition, multiple allergens in a multiplex assay. The marginal cost of adding the fortieth analyte to an existing extraction is close to zero, but the fortieth analyte is a separate determination, and determinations are what the market buys.

Eurofins’ 2025 disclosures contain a clean illustration of how that works in practice. The company launched a test for cereulide, the emetic toxin produced by Bacillus cereus, using liquid chromatography with tandem mass spectrometry under ISO standard 18465:2017, aimed at dairy products, infant formula and oils. Cereulide is heat-stable, pH-resistant and enzyme-tolerant: it survives the processing that kills the organism that made it. It is not a pathogen test. It is a toxin test, on a matrix set that was not routinely screened for it a decade ago. That is how the analyte count grows — not by testing more of the same thing, but by making a previously invisible hazard visible and writing it into a scope.

What the market is actually buying

Once you accept that the growth is volume rather than price, the question becomes where the volume goes. And on the disclosed numbers, it goes to the laboratories.

The largest service lines are growing faster than the market or close to it. SGS reported 7.3 per cent organic growth in its Health and Nutrition business in 2025 on CHF 882 million of sales, and said in terms that its Food business delivered double-digit organic growth driven by demand for contaminants, safety testing and advisory services. Intertek grew 3.9 per cent like-for-like at constant currency. Bureau Veritas grew its Agri-Food and Commodities business 3.7 per cent organically. Eurofins grew 3.7 per cent organically at group level and described pricing attainment alongside volume growth in European Food and Feed Testing.

Then look at the company that sells the test kit rather than the test result. Neogen’s Food Safety segment grew 0.5 per cent in the fiscal year to 31 May 2026, on USD 641.1 million. Group revenue fell 2.7 per cent. Its gross margin was 50.3 per cent on an adjusted basis and its adjusted EBITDA margin 20.4 per cent — margins a laboratory cannot dream of — and its revenue went nowhere.

That is the asymmetry worth understanding. A reagent kit is a visible line item on a purchase order and it is compared against competing kits on price. A laboratory result is a bundle: sample logistics, an accredited method, a turnaround commitment, interpretation, and an audit trail. None of those components is line-itemed on the invoice, so the laboratory prices a service while the kit supplier prices a part. When the growth arrives as more volume rather than higher price, the party selling the bundle collects it and the party selling the part does not.

The part of the model that does not add up, and does not go away

Here is the uncomfortable check, and it is worth putting in front of anyone who uses these numbers.

If the market grows at 5.93 per cent, the companies inside it should be growing at something like 5.93 per cent. On the food-testing lines they actually disclose, the four service-heavy ones averaged 4.65 per cent in 2025. That is a gap of 1.28 percentage points, and it is not a rounding error.

Currency explains part of it. SGS grew 5.6 per cent organically and 2.2 per cent as reported — a 3.4 point drag. Bureau Veritas grew 6.5 per cent organically and 3.6 per cent as reported. Intertek grew 4.3 per cent at constant currency and 1.1 per cent at actual rates. On a constant-currency basis the same four lines average 4.92 per cent, and the gap narrows to about one percentage point.

What remains after the currency effect is the more interesting question, and the honest answer is that a market growing at 5.93 per cent whose largest disclosed participants grow at roughly 4.9 per cent must contain growth that no public company reports. The plausible locations are the several hundred unlisted regional laboratory groups that dominate testing in most national markets, and the in-house laboratories inside very large processors and retailers. Neither appears as a segment in any annual report, and both are structurally invisible to an index.

That is not a defence of the forecast. It is a specification of what would have to be true for the forecast to hold, which is a more useful thing to publish than a number.

Why this matters to a buyer

If you are procuring testing, the analysis has a direct commercial implication. In a market where the average price rises at 1.23 per cent a year, a supplier asking for annual increases well above that is not passing through market conditions; it is repricing. The counter-evidence is specific and available: Eurofins reports pricing attainment and volume growth together, which describes a market where price discipline holds, not one where it is being extracted.

If you are buying laboratory capacity rather than laboratory tests — a multi-year outsourcing arrangement, a dedicated site, a managed service — the more relevant fact is that capacity in this category is being acquired rather than built. Eurofins completed 40 business combinations in 2025 at a cost of EUR 261 million for EUR 286 million of pro-forma revenue. That is 0.91 times revenue and 13.7 times adjusted EBITDA. SGS completed 24 bolt-ons representing over CHF 190 million of annual sales. Regional laboratories are changing hands below book-value multiples of sales because they earn poor returns, and the consolidator’s return comes from removing duplicated overhead and spreading a largely fixed accreditation cost across more results rather than from raising prices.

Which means the negotiating leverage in a testing contract is not where it appears. It is not in the per-test price, which is competitive and barely inflating. It is in the scope: which methods are accredited, what turnaround is committed, and who absorbs the cost when a limit moves and a method has to be revalidated. That is where the money actually sits in this market, and it is the line the industry would rather you did not read too closely.

The full analysis, including the value chain, technology, competitive, regulatory, investment and risk chapters, is published in the Global Food Safety Testing Market Report 2026–2033.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is the food safety testing market growing because of price or volume?

Volume. Of the USD 15.1 billion added to the market between 2025 and 2033, USD 11.31 billion, or 74.9 per cent, comes from running more tests at roughly the price the market already pays. Only USD 3.79 billion, or 25.1 per cent, comes from each test being worth more. The realised price per test rises from USD 14.49 in 2025 to USD 15.98 in 2033, which is 1.23 per cent a year.

Why does the average price of a food safety test rise so slowly?

Because cheap methods do not disappear when expensive ones arrive. Molecular and rapid methods are more expensive per result than culture, which pushes the blended price up, but culture-based microbiology remains the reference method and does not exit. The mix shift is therefore gradual rather than stepwise. At the same time the hardware behind molecular testing gets cheaper on a learning curve, and competition among accredited laboratories passes some of that through.

How many times has EU Regulation 2023/915 been amended?

Yes, and that is the report's central finding. Each amendment to an EU maximum level changes what must be measured and at what limit. Each change requires an accredited laboratory to check whether its validated method still covers the requirement and, where it does not, to revalidate. A food business must also reset its supplier specification. Neither activity is discretionary, so the demand is created by the regulatory calendar rather than by food consumption.

What is the FSMA 204 compliance date?

The regulated date is 20 July 2028. The original compliance date for all persons subject to the rule was 20 January 2026. The FDA proposed a 30-month extension to 20 July 2028, and the Continuing Appropriations, Agriculture, Legislative Branch, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Extensions Act of 2026 directed the agency not to enforce the rule before that same date, which the FDA has said it intends to honour. The FDA's own Food Traceability Rule page still carries a line instructing businesses that the compliance date is 20 January 2026.